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DIVIDE AND CONQUER: USING AN 
ACCESSIONS TAX TO COMBAT DYNASTIC 
WEALTH TRANSFERS 
MIRANDA PERRY FLEISCHER* 
Abstract: The current estate tax raises little revenue, yet is ill designed to fur-
ther the social goals used to justify it. This Article takes one frequently men-
tioned goal—minimizing dynastic wealth transfers—and explores what in-
sights focusing on that objective yields for the design of the transfer tax sys-
tem. It starts from the premise that what renders dynastic wealth transfers 
problematic is that such transfers can bestow upon the recipient unearned po-
litical and economic power, which contravenes the democratic ideal that pow-
er should be earned, not inherited. Under this view, the tax system should be 
concerned with neither the build-up of wealth per se nor transfers of wealth 
that are not large enough to bestow power upon the recipient. Instead, the tax 
system should be concerned only with transfers of wealth large enough to 
confer economic and political power on the recipient. The structure that best 
reflects this concern is a progressive cumulative accessions tax that focuses on 
the recipient, instead of an estate tax that focuses on the transferor. Each recip-
ient should have an extremely high exemption amount, given that receiving a 
few hundred thousand or couple million dollars does not give one power. 
Lastly, there should be no generation-skipping penalty, because what matters 
is how many individuals have the ability to use the power accompanying the 
wealth. 
INTRODUCTION 
The current estate tax is neither fish nor fowl. It raises little revenue, 
yet is ill designed to further the various social goals most often used to justi-
fy it: adding progressivity to the tax system, backstopping the income tax, 
reducing ex post inequality, increasing ex ante equality of opportunity, and 
minimizing dynastic wealth transfers.1 Each of these goals, however, has 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2016, Miranda Perry Fleischer. All rights reserved. 
 * Professor of Law, The University of San Diego School of Law. I would like to thank Brid-
get Crawford, Noel Cunningham, Ray Madoff, Jim Repetti, Mila Sohoni, Lee-ford Tritt, Larry 
Zelenak, and participants in the Boston College Law School and American Counsel of Trust and 
Estate Counsel Symposium on the Centennial of the Estate Tax and UCLA’s Tax Policy and Pub-
lic Finance Colloquium for valuable comments, as well as Amina Moussa for her helpful research 
assistance. 
 1 See generally Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 469 (2007) (discussing ex ante equality of opportunity and the estate tax); Mark L. Ascher, 
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different implications for the design of a transfer tax system.2 This Article 
takes one frequently mentioned goal of the transfer tax system—minimizing 
dynastic wealth transfers—and explores what insights focusing on that goal 
yields for the design of the transfer tax system. It argues—perhaps counter-
intuitively—that the goal of minimizing dynastic wealth transfers suggests a 
progressive accessions tax with an extremely large per-recipient exemption 
and no generation-skipping penalty. 
This Article starts from the premise that what renders large transfers of 
wealth from one individual to another problematic is that such transfers be-
stow upon the recipient unearned power and influence over others. This 
premise differs from the usual justifications for minimizing dynastic wealth 
transfers.3 One such justification, for example, argues that large wealth con-
centrations in and of themselves—whether earned or inherited—are harmful 
to democratic ideals.4 Under this view, taxing wealth transfers helps prevent 
the build-up of wealth concentrations in the first instance.5 The argument 
                                                                                                                           
Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1990) (same); Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the 
Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 269–73 (1983) (discussing the progressivity of the 
estate tax). 
 2 Recent scholarship has begun explicitly exploring what some of these goals suggest for the 
design of a transfer tax system. Anne Alstott, for example, mines the nuances of equality-of-
opportunity theories and argues that such principles counsel replacing the estate tax with an acces-
sions tax (which she refers to as an inheritance tax). See generally Alstott, supra note 1 (proposing 
such a tax in order to further equality-of-opportunity goals). In the same vein, Lily Batchelder 
explores welfarist theories and proposes what she terms a “comprehensive inheritance tax” that 
would include gifts and bequests in the recipient’s income, subject to a 15% surtax. See generally 
Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expect from Heirs? The Case for a Comprehensive In-
heritance Tax, 63 TAX L. REV. 1 (2009) (proposing such a scheme in order to enhance social wel-
fare). 
 3 See, e.g., Ascher, supra note 1, at 87–99 (exploring various reasons for taxing wealth trans-
fers and suggesting that protecting a democratic form of government is one reason for curtailing 
large inheritances); Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REV. 223, 
235–36 (1955) (describing the Roosevelt Administration’s rationale for an estate tax, namely, as a 
means of preventing transmissions of wealth inconsistent with American ideals); James R. Repetti, 
Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 828–50 (2002) (discussing several justifi-
cations for taxing wealth transfers and arguing that large wealth concentrations are inherently 
harmful for political and economic reasons). 
 4 See Repetti, supra note 3, at 826–27. 
 5 Id. The American Law Institute (“ALI”) accessions tax proposal, prepared by William An-
drews, also seems to be motivated by this concern. See William D. Andrews, Reporter’s Study of 
the Accessions Tax Proposal, in AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 446, 
460–68, 475 (1969) [hereinafter ALI Proposal] (conceptualizing an accessions tax as a periodic 
wealth tax). Several other past proposals appear to be similarly motivated. See Joseph M. Dodge, 
Replacing the Estate Tax with a Reimagined Accessions Tax, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 997, 1003–04 
(2009) [hereinafter Dodge, Replacing] (arguing for limits on inherited wealth in order to prevent 
unearned and undeserved wealth concentrations); Harry J. Rudick, What Alternative to the Estate 
and Gift Taxes, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 150, 167–68 (1950) (suggesting an accessions tax as a means of 
preventing wealth concentration). Although Alstott’s focus is on equality-of-opportunity concerns, 
she too seems to view the anti-dynastic wealth argument as relating to the build-up of wealth with-
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that large wealth concentrations are intrinsically harmful and should be 
taxed as such, however, is contested.6 This Article sets that debate aside to 
focus on what it hopes is a less contested argument: the proposition that 
regardless of what one believes to be the effects of earned power on democ-
racy, there is something antithetical to this country’s democratic ideals 
about being able to transfer power and influence to one’s heirs. 
This second common justification for minimizing dynastic wealth 
transfers is to prevent the creation of a hereditary plutocracy or aristocracy.7 
Most often, this is expressed in equality-of-opportunity terms and reflects a 
notion that it is unfair for parents to pass along financial advantages to their 
children.8 These ideals hold that it is unfair for individuals to have differing 
abilities to develop fully their talents and pursue their definitions of a good 
life based on the chance circumstances of their birth.9 Wealth transfer taxa-
tion is therefore justified as a means of evening the playing field so that 
                                                                                                                           
in families, instead of relating to any specific harm from the transfer of great wealth apart from the 
fact such transfers enable wealth accumulation. See Alstott, supra note 1, at 518–19. Alstott sug-
gests that “if the aim of the tax is to fight the concentration of wealth within family dynasties,” 
then generation-skipping penalties or a periodic wealth tax would be appropriate. Id. These sug-
gestions imply a view equating dynastic wealth with wealth concentration itself. In contrast, this 
Article’s view is that the existence of wealth concentrations is not problematic, but that their trans-
fer is. For an argument that wealth concentrations naturally dissipate over time even without 
wealth transfer taxes, see Joseph R. Dodge, Comparing a Reformed Estate Tax with an Accessions 
Tax and an Income Inclusion System, and Abandoning the Generation-Skipping Tax, 56 SMU L. 
REV. 551, 555 (2003) [hereinafter Dodge, Comparing] (arguing that only a handful of dynasties 
might sustain themselves over time). 
 6 See Dodge, Replacing, supra note 5, at 1002 (“[P]enalizing accumulations of wealth—an 
aspect of the American dream—is not particularly popular as a political goal, and it is suspect 
from the vantage point of liberal theory.”). See generally Eric Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes Be 
Justified, 53 TAX L. REV. 263 (2000) (critiquing and refuting justifications for wealth taxes). 
 7 See, e.g., Ascher, supra note 1, at 82–83 (implying that unlimited inheritance is linked to the 
existence of aristocracies); Irving Fisher, Some Impending National Problems, 24 J. POL. ECON. 
694, 711 (discussing aristocracies). Unfortunately, prior literature is often less than clear about 
what is meant by such terms, and often blends distinct concepts when discussing them. See Eisen-
stein, supra note 3, at 258–59 (blending concerns about transferring economic power with equali-
ty-of-opportunity concerns). This Article is not the first to note that past scholarship often does not 
identify as clearly as it could what social goal it believes the transfer taxes should pursue. Alstott, 
for example, has criticized the tendency of prior scholarship to conflate various goals of the estate 
tax with each other. Alstott, supra note 1, at 471 (arguing that past scholarship often conflates 
equality-of-opportunity ideals with goals that are distinct from such ideals). 
 8 See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 1, at 518; Ascher, supra note 1, at 74–75; Fisher, supra note 7, 
at 711. As Alstott notes, concerns about dynastic wealth concentrations are distinct from equality-
of-opportunity concerns. Alstott, supra note 1, at 518. She is therefore careful to clearly ground 
her argument for an accessions tax on equality-of-opportunity grounds. See id. 
 9 See Alstott, supra note 1, at 516 (arguing that the concern of equal opportunity theory is 
ensuring that each child “can develop the capabilities she will need to make informed choices 
about her life as an adult” (emphasis added)). 
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one’s educational achievement, job prospects, and economic class are not 
determined by birth.10 
This Article focuses on a less discussed interpretation of what consti-
tutes a hereditary plutocracy or aristocracy: the ability to pass power and 
influence on to one’s heirs by transferring to them huge sums of wealth. 
Under this view, the transfer tax system should be unconcerned about 
wealth transmissions that are not large enough to bestow upon the recipient 
power and influence over others. At some point, however, transferring large 
wealth accumulations to one’s heirs is tantamount to passing power and in-
fluence over others, which contravenes the American ideal that influence 
should be both earned and open to all.11 As President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
argued over eighty years ago, dynastic wealth accumulations “amount to the 
perpetuation of great and undesirable concentration of control in a relatively 
few individuals over the employment and welfare of many, many others.”12 
Roosevelt believed that inherited economic power of that kind is as incon-
sistent to American ideals as inherited political power was to the founders 
of the country.13  
Although this overlaps somewhat with equality-of-opportunity ideals, 
it is a distinct concern and has different implications for the design of 
wealth transfer taxation. Families with wealth of only a few hundred thou-
sand dollars (or less) can confer on their children the type of advantages 
that theorists believe inhibit equality of opportunity: private schools and 
tutors, college and graduate education, and perhaps a down payment on a 
                                                                                                                           
 10 To that end, equality-of-opportunity theorists focus on ways in which transfer taxes can be 
used to equalize starting points. Alstott, for example, supports a progressive inheritance tax based 
on the amount of gratuitous transfers an individual receives during one’s life because such trans-
fers confer a greater ability to pursue one’s life projects. Alstott, supra note 1, at 502–03. And 
because such transfers impart more advantages the earlier they are received in life, Alstott would 
tax transfers received by younger recipients more heavily. Id. at 523–24. In contrast, Edward 
McCaffery has argued that certain aspects of the current structure undermine equality-of-
opportunity goals by encouraging parents to transmit wealth to their children earlier than other-
wise. Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283, 
294, 314–18 (1994). McCaffery’s solution is a progressive consumption tax. Id. at 345–58. 
 11 See, e.g., THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER: THE GREAT DEPRESSION 1929–1941, at 
136 (1952) (noting the American people’s traditional opposition to inherited wealth because “sev-
eral million dollars is economic power”); David G. Duff, Taxing Inherited Wealth: A Philosophi-
cal Argument, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 3, 25 (1993) (“[T]he institution of dynastic power is even 
more opposed to democratic ideals than the political influence of economic power confined to 
only one generation.”); Eisenstein, supra note 3, at 258–59 (stating that a large inheritance “be-
comes hereditary economic power, which is no more tenable than hereditary political power”); 
Jerome Nathanson, The Ethics of Inheritance, in 1 SOCIAL MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS 74, 89 
(E.N. Cahn ed., 1948) (“[I]t is not easy to justify the possession of power through inheritance. On 
feudal grounds, it can be done; it seems . . . impossible on democratic grounds.”). 
 12 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Speech to Congress on Tax Revision (June 19, 1935), 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15088 [https://perma.cc/4Y5Z-V9QG]. 
 13 See id. 
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house.14 Yet structuring a transfer tax to reach into the upper middle classes 
has its drawbacks. The exemption would have to be extremely low, which 
would exacerbate political opposition and avoidance measures that often 
exacerbate inequality of opportunity.15 More importantly, such a tax would 
be largely ineffective, for the transmission of human capital occurs when 
parents and children are young, not when the children are middle-aged and 
the parents elderly. It is questionable, moreover, whether discouraging par-
ents who can invest in their children’s human capital from doing so is desir-
able as a policy matter; limiting the extent to which parents may pass along 
these types of advantages to their children strikes many as contravening our 
innate desire for our children to have better lives than we do. The most ef-
fective way of equalizing opportunities is to engage in greater leveling-up 
efforts, instead of by using transfer taxes to level down. 
More importantly, although giving one’s child a few hundred thousand 
dollars, or even a couple million dollars, enables them to lead a more com-
fortable life than otherwise, such sums do not really give the child power 
and influence over others. In contrast, directly passing on wealth accumula-
tions that are large enough to give the holder economic and political power 
over others raises problems of a much greater magnitude.16 Unfortunately, 
this worry has received far less attention in the legal literature than equality-
of-opportunity concerns or the harms from concentrated wealth generally.17 
To that end, this Article explores what a set of transfer taxes designed 
to minimize the transmission of this type of wealth from generation to gen-
eration would look like. Its aim is to add to the theoretical literature on 
wealth transfer taxation by highlighting the ways in which current law as 
well as various reform proposals do or do not track this fear of inherited 
power. Although this Article’s goal is therefore theoretical in nature, it does 
address certain political and administrative difficulties. The Article proceeds 
as follows. Part I briefly discusses the political and economic concerns 
raised by transfers of large sums of wealth.18 Part II explains why an acces-
sions tax is superior to other options for taxing wealth transfers in achieving 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See Alstott, supra note 1, at 485–89 (discussing the impact of inheritance on equality of 
opportunity); Ascher, supra note 1, at 71, 87–91 (discussing effects of inherited wealth on families 
and children). 
 15 See generally McCaffrey, supra note 10 (describing political opposition to estate taxes and 
the increased consumption and early gifting that a stronger estate tax would likely spur). 
 16 See Rakowski, supra note 6, at 292. 
 17 See generally Alstott, supra note 1 (focusing on equality of opportunity); Dodge, Replac-
ing, supra note 5 (addressing the problem of inherited wealth and wealth concentration); Repetti, 
supra note 3 (describing the harms from concentrated wealth); Rudick, supra note 5 (focusing on 
the problem of wealth concentration). 
 18 See infra notes 21–38 and accompanying text. 
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the goal of minimizing dynastic wealth transfers.19 Part III describes the 
main structural elements of this Article’s accessions tax proposal, including 
the proposed exemption level, rate structure, and the treatment of transfers 
in trust.20 
I. WHY WORRY ABOUT DYNASTIC WEALTH TRANSFERS? 
The ideal that political power should not be inheritable is one of our 
country’s fundamental values.21 Another such value, however, is a strong 
respect for a set of private property rights that includes wide testamentary 
freedom.22 The fact that great wealth generally brings with it economic and 
political power highlights a tension between these two ideals: in some in-
stances, handing wealth down to one’s heirs is tantamount to handing them 
power over others. 
In our country’s early days these concerns motivated legislation to 
overturn English property arrangements such as primogeniture and entail.23 
By virtue of such arrangements, the handing down of property in England 
also included the handing down of political power.24 That type of aristocra-
cy is antithetical to America’s governing ideals, as many of our founders 
recognized.25 In proposing to end entail, for example, Thomas Jefferson 
argued that inheritable power was incompatible with “a well-ordered repub-
lic.”26 The preamble to legislation reforming North Carolina’s inheritance 
laws reflects similar sentiments, suggesting that concentrated inheritances 
“tend[] only to raise the wealth and importance of particular families and 
individuals, giving them an unequal and undue influence in a republic.”27 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See infra notes 39–68 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 69–155 and accompanying text. 
 21 See Ascher, supra note 1, at 93–94 (noting that Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson rec-
ognized the danger of inherited power). 
 22 Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in 12 DEATH, TAXES 
AND FAMILY PROPERTY: ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT 1, 1 (Edward C. Halbach, 
Jr. ed., 1977) [hereinafter DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY]. 
 23 Ascher, supra note 1, at 94–95 (declaring that the purpose of early American inheritance 
reform “was to prevent the disparities in hereditary wealth that had occurred in Europe and thus to 
protect elective representative government”); Stanley Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inher-
itance in the American Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977) (noting that the purpose 
of inheritance reform was “to establish the foundation of a republican polity”). 
 24 Katz, supra note 23, at 14–15.  
 25 See, e.g., 1 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 58 (Paul Leicester 
Ford ed., 1904). 
 26 Thomas Jefferson, Bill for Abolition of Entails, TEACHINGAMERICANHISTORY.ORG, http://
teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/bill-for-abolition-of-entails [https://perma.cc/Z33K-
BUV4] (documenting text of 1776 bill). 
 27 See Ascher, supra note 1, at 95 n.144 (quoting Act of April 1784, ch. 22, 1784 N.C. Ses-
sion Laws 574, available at http://docsouth.unc.edu/csr/index.html/document/csr24-0014 [https://
perma.cc/6ZVY-G8HK]). 
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Noah Webster similarly argued that families should not be able to hand in-
fluence down generation to generation, in order to protect the desired bal-
ance of power in the many instead of the few.28 
Although power is not tied to land in modern America the way it was 
in England pre-World War I, few would dispute that great wealth brings 
with it power and influence over others. First, as James Repetti has careful-
ly shown, wealth enables one to directly influence the political process in a 
variety of ways29: by influencing the media’s news and editorial coverage 
through the granting or withholding of advertising;30 by making substantial 
(yet limited) contributions directly to candidates, parties, and political 
committees and unlimited contributions to § 501(c)(4) organizations that 
engage in issue advocacy and campaign intervention; and by making con-
tributions to and receiving increased access to elected officials already in 
office.31 Wealth also enables influence in a number of additional ways; for 
example, elected leaders often consult economic leaders for advice.32 Other 
times, elected officials follow the wishes of economic leaders on non-
economic matters in order to protect jobs and industry in their areas.33 
Business leaders are often civic leaders who can also shape the goals and 
priorities of a community from the ground up. 34 Lastly, great wealth makes 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See id. at 95 n.145. 
 29 See Repetti, supra note 3, at 841–49; see also Gerald R. Jantscher, The Aims of Death Tax-
ation, in 6 DEATH, TAXES, AND FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 22, at 53 (linking the need for 
campaign finance laws with the unequal distribution of wealth). But see ARTHUR M. OKUN, 
EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 29 (1975) (suggesting that “specific and detailed 
rules” that prevent the wealthy from “spending money to acquire undue power” are “far more 
promising” than “the most ambitious program of progressive taxation”). 
 30 Sometimes this influence comes through control of the media. For example, many view 
Fox News and the Wall Street Journal as having conservative biases and MSNBC and the New 
York Times as having liberal biases. 
 31 Repetti, supra note 3, at 843–49; see also Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable Contributions 
in an Ideal Estate Tax, 60 TAX L. REV. 263, 278–79 (2007) (describing the ways wealthy individuals 
can exert public influence). Recent comments by Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump 
illustrate the effect of large contributions. See Jill Ornitz & Ryan Struyk, Donald Trump’s Surprising-
ly Honest Lessons About Big Money in Politics, ABC News (Aug. 11, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/
Politics/donald-trumps-surprisingly-honest-lessons-big-money-politics/story?id=32993736 [https://
perma.cc/KM2W-433S]. When asked why he made a number of contributions to Democratic candi-
dates, Trump answered: “I give to everybody. When they call, I give. And you know what, when I 
need something from them two years later, three years later, I call them. They are there for me.” Id.  
 32 See Fleischer, supra note 31, at 279 & n.75. 
 33 See id. After public outcry from a number of large corporations, for example, Arizona Gov-
ernor Jan Brewer vetoed a bill that would have protected the right of religious businesses owners 
to refuse service to same-sex couples. Cindy Carcamo, Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer Vetoes So-Called 
Anti-Gay Bill, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/26/nation/la-na-
nn-arizona-gay-brewer-20140226 [https://perma.cc/K9NA-FYNY]. 
 34 Hypothetically, it is not hard to imagine a small town in which the CEO of a company 
holds influence over the direction of the community.  
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it easier to run for elected office.35 For these reasons, transferring great 
wealth often means transferring political power and influence to one’s heirs. 
Great wealth can also, depending on the circumstances, yield econom-
ic control. Although official company towns are long gone, there are many 
communities where a few wealthy families dominate economic life.36 In 
some towns, for example, residents depend on a small group of employers 
for jobs. In such communities, decisions made by a small group of people—
regarding wages, plant expansions, and plant closings—heavily mold citi-
zens’ economic lives. In other communities, residents might depend on a 
small group of companies for necessities like food and housing. In those 
instances, decisions made by owners of construction firms or grocery stores 
also strongly shape residents’ economic lives.37 In some cases, therefore, 
transferring great wealth means transferring economic power and influence 
to one’s heirs. 
Although past scholarship contains occasional brief references to the 
notion that inherited economic and political power is antithetical to demo-
cratic ideas,38 scholars have not yet fleshed out what this goal suggests for 
the design of the transfer tax system. Such is the goal of this Article. 
II. WHY AN ACCESSIONS TAX? 
Our current, transferee-oriented system focuses on the total amount of 
wealth transferred by a decedent during life and at death, regardless of the 
recipient.39 Other possibilities for treating wealth transfers do, however, 
exist. An accessions tax imposes a tax on the transferee based on the total 
                                                                                                                           
 35 This is evidenced by Ross Perot, Donald Trump, Michael Bloomberg, etc. See Michael 
Barbaro, Bloomberg Spent $102 Million to Win 3rd Term, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/11/28/nyregion/28spending.html [https://perma.cc/X5P5-TRN9] (noting 
the large amounts of personal wealth spent by Michael Bloomberg during his three mayoral elec-
tions); Tina Nguyen, Donald Trump’s $10.8 Million Loan to His Campaign Shows He’s Finally 
Getting Serious, VANITY FAIR (Feb. 1, 2016, 10:12 AM), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/
02/donald-trump-self-funded [https://perma.cc/EW3Q-Q7KH] (describing how Trump has used his 
personal wealth to make loans to his presidential campaign); Simi Shah, In the Business of Politics, 
HARV. POL. R. (Nov. 27, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/business-politics/ 
[https://perma.cc/6QLP-LCNX] (noting the amount of personal money spent on campaigns by busi-
nesspeople such as Ross Perot). 
 36 See Fleischer, supra note 31, at 280–82 (describing company control of communities even 
in the era after “Pullman towns”). 
 37 Id. at 280–81. 
 38 See, e.g., Eisenstein, supra note 3, at 258–59. 
 39 Subject to certain requirements, however, transfers to spouses and charities are not taxed. 
I.R.C. §§ 2055–2056 (2012). Transfers that “skip” generations, such as when a grandfather makes 
a transfer directly to a grandson, incur an additional generation-skipping transfer tax that is meant 
to mimic the tax burden that would be incurred if wealth were handed from one generation direct-
ly to the next-lower generation. See I.R.C. § 2601 (2012). 
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amount of gratuitous receipts during the transferee’s lifetime.40 An inher-
itance tax also imposes a tax on the transferee, but on an annual instead of 
lifetime basis.41 Although these three alternatives are separate from the in-
come tax system, the income tax treatment of gifts and bequests could also 
be changed. For example, transfers could be treated as deemed realization 
events for the donor, or the carryover basis rule could be applied to bequests 
as well as gifts. Lastly, gifts and bequests could be included in the income 
of the recipient.42 In theory, nothing precludes imposing both a transfer tax 
(be it an estate, accessions, or inheritance tax) and changing the income tax 
treatment of gratuitous transfers. Largely due to political concerns, howev-
er, the two are generally viewed as either-or propositions.43 
Of these alternatives, an accessions tax is the best way to minimize 
one’s ability to pass power-conveying wealth to others. Such an accessions 
tax would have increasing marginal rates based on a transferee’s total cumu-
lative receipts. Moreover, each transferee’s exemption level should be high-
er than most other commentators suggest,44 to reflect that power over others 
accompanies extremely large bequests, not bequests of a few million dollars 
that merely enable one to live a more luxurious life. The proposal explored 
in this Article attempts to balance two main concerns. First, any given indi-
vidual’s ability to exert control over others rises with the individual’s 
wealth. Second, control that arises from inherited wealth is more pernicious 
                                                                                                                           
 40 Alstott, supra note 1, at 502. 
 41 Id. Inheritance tax rates typically vary based on the relationship between the transferor and 
transferee; transfers between close relatives are usually taxed less heavily than transfers between 
remote relatives and unrelated individuals. Under both accessions and inheritance taxes, transfers 
from spouses are generally untaxed. Unfortunately, the terms “inheritance tax” and “accessions 
tax” are often used interchangeably. Alstott uses the terms “inheritance tax” and “accessions tax” 
to refer to an accessions tax and the term “annual inheritance tax” to refer to an inheritance tax 
levied on one’s annual receipt of gratuitous transfers. Id. 
 42 Batchelder has proposed what she calls a “comprehensive inheritance tax,” in which gifts 
and bequests would be included in one’s income once their cumulative total exceeds an exemption 
amount of $1.9 million. Batchelder, supra note 2, at 2, 62. Instead of using a separate rate sched-
ule, Batchelder proposes that such receipts be taxed at the recipient’s marginal income tax rate 
plus 15%. Id. at 62. 
 43 See id. at 87; Joseph M. Dodge, A Deemed Realization Event Is Superior to Carryover 
Basis (and Avoids Most of the Problems of the Estate and Gift Tax), 54 TAX L. REV. 421, 431 
(2001). 
 44 See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 1, at 506 (discussing a lifetime exemption of $100,000 and 
arguing that a $2 million exemption is too high); William D. Andrews, The Accessions Tax Pro-
posal, 22 TAX L. REV. 589, 592 (1967) (suggesting a lifetime exemption of $24,000, which is the 
equivalent of roughly $170,000 in 2015 dollars, according to the author’s calculation using the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics Inflation Calculator); Batchelder, supra note 2, at 62 (proposing a $1.9 
million lifetime exemption); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Accessions Tax, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. & 
TR. J. 211–12 (1988) (suggesting a $700,000 exemption, which is about $1.4 million in 2015 
dollars, according to the author’s calculation using the Bureau of Labor Statistics Inflation Calcu-
lator). 
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than control that arises from earned wealth. Accordingly, section A of this 
Part demonstrates why a progressive accessions tax is superior to an estate 
tax at combatting dynastic wealth transfers.45 Section B argues that a pro-
gressive accessions tax is preferable to alternative reform proposals.46 Final-
ly, section C briefly addresses the assertion that a progressive accessions tax 
is unfair.47 
A. A Progressive Accessions Tax Is Superior to an Estate Tax at Combating 
the Transmission of Dynastic Wealth 
Consider the intuition that one’s ability to exert economic and political 
influence depends on how much wealth one has. Receiving $1 million will 
enable one to live a cushier life than otherwise, but it likely will not in-
crease one’s ability to exert influence over others. In contrast, it is conceiv-
able that receiving a larger sum (perhaps $20 million, perhaps $50 million) 
does enable one to have control over others. A transfer tax with the motiva-
tion of minimizing the transmission of power from generation to generation 
should first and foremost encourage donors to break up their wealth into 
smaller chunks that bring with them less influence over others. 
Aside from the charitable deduction, the current estate tax does not 
contain any such incentive.48 By focusing on what the donor transfers out, 
regardless of the recipient, the treatment is the same whether the donor 
makes one extremely large bequest or many smaller ones.49 In contrast, a 
progressive accessions tax would encourage donors to make more small 
transfers instead of one large one because the recipients each have their own 
exemption levels and rate ladders.50 
To illustrate how an accessions tax works, imagine that Alice dies with 
an estate of $50 million and makes no spousal or charitable transfers. Fur-
ther assume that she is tax-sensitive.51 Under an estate tax, all amounts 
above Alice’s exemption level will be taxed regardless of to whom she 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See infra notes 48–54 and accompanying text. 
 46 See infra notes 55–66 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra note 67–68 and accompanying text. 
 48 To the extent that the marital deduction encourages a decedent to split his or her estate 
between the decedent’s spouse and descendants, this split is generally temporary. Most estate 
plans provide that assets pass to descendants after the surviving spouse dies. 
 49 See Dodge, Replacing, supra note 5, at 1004 (noting that an estate tax is indifferent to how 
wealth is dispersed). 
 50 See Alstott, supra note 1, at 503 (making this point with respect to the goal of equality of 
opportunity); Dodge, Replacing, supra note 5, at 1004 (comparing and contrasting accessions and 
estate taxes). 
 51 Some evidence, albeit limited, suggests that tax incentives influence how donors divide 
their estates. See Batchelder, supra note 2, at 74 (discussing evidence that donors make financially 
motivated bequests). 
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transfers her assets. If the exemption level is $5 million, $45 million will be 
taxed no matter how she splits up her estate. Under an accessions tax mod-
el, however, Alice can minimize overall tax liability by dividing her estate 
into more, rather than fewer, pieces. Assume that each transferee has a $5 
million exemption level. If so, Alice’s wealth will avoid tax altogether if she 
makes ten $5 million transfers instead of a single $50 million transfer. Simi-
lar incentives exist even if there are fewer than ten people whom Alice 
wishes to benefit. Perhaps she only desires to help five descendants. If she 
leaves each of these five individuals $10 million, only $25 million of her 
wealth will be taxed. 
Applying increasing marginal rates to a recipient’s cumulative receipts 
creates a similar incentive for the transferor. To the extent Alice is tax sensi-
tive, she will search for individuals who have previously received fewer, 
rather than more, gratuitous transfers. Even if such individuals have already 
used up their exemptions, Alice can reduce taxes on her wealth by making 
transfers to individuals who are still at the bottom of their rate ladders.52 
Her wealth will thus take advantage of several trips up the lower rungs of 
the rate ladders, instead of the single trip to which she would be limited un-
der an estate tax.53 
Encouraging donors to divide their estates into smaller portions is not 
the only goal better served by an accessions tax. Such a structure also re-
flects that the total amount any individual inherits affects that individual’s 
ability to wield power over others. Because the accessions tax would be 
imposed at increasing rates on the cumulative amount of gratuitous transfers 
received by a transferee, it better demonstrates this concern than an estate 
tax that depends on the size of the donor’s estate. First, consider Bob who 
inherits $50 million from five different sources. The tax burden on that 
wealth will likely be heavier under an accessions tax than under an estate 
tax. Because an accessions tax taxes each individual cumulatively on that 
individual’s receipts, each transferee only gets one exemption and one trip 
up the rate ladder. Therefore, transferees have only one chance to take ad-
vantage of the lower rates that apply to the bottom rungs. In an estate tax, 
however, the five transferors will each get to use an exemption and take 
                                                                                                                           
 52 This assumes that the rate schedule applies increasing marginal rates to amounts actually 
taxed. This contrasts with the current structure, where the amount shielded from tax by a dece-
dent’s applicable credit amount is larger than the break point for the top marginal rate of 40%. 
This Article does not address whether the per-transferee exemption amount should be structured 
as a credit (as under current law) or an exclusion or exemption. 
 53 Even if an accessions tax does not lead Alice to change how she divides up her estate, it 
would impose a heavier burden on transfers that transmit power-conveying wealth than on other 
transfers. See Rudick, supra note 5, at 168. 
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their own trips up five separate rate ladders, thus taking advantage of the 
lower rates five times instead of once. 
Next, compare Bob, who inherits $50 million over the course of his 
lifetime, to Chloe, who only inherits $10 million over the course of hers. 
Bob can wield more power and influence with his bequest than can Chloe. 
Taxing Bob and Chloe according to what each receives, instead of what 
their benefactors have relinquished, better reflects the notion that more 
wealth translates into more power. The current system, which focuses on 
the transferor, does a poor job of tying the tax burden to the amounts re-
ceived by a given recipient. For example, one study estimated that 22% of 
heirs burdened by the estate tax inherited less than $500,000, whereas 21% 
of individuals inheriting more than $2,500,000 faced no estate tax burden.54 
B. A Progressive Accessions Tax Is Preferable to Alternative Reform 
Options for Combatting the Transmission of Dynastic Wealth 
In terms of minimizing dynastic wealth transfers, an accessions tax is 
also superior to other common reform proposals: adopting some type of 
inheritance tax, including gifts and bequests in income, making death a real-
ization event, or applying carryover basis to bequests. 
First consider the annual inheritance tax, which taxes individuals on 
the total amount of gratuitous transfers received in a given year.55 By focus-
ing on what an individual receives annually instead of over a lifetime, an 
annual inheritance tax does not reflect as accurately the notion that in-
creased wealth provides more opportunities to exert control over others. 
Dennis, who receives $50 million all in one year, will be taxed more heavi-
ly under an inheritance tax than Emma, who receives $10 million per year 
for five years, even though both receive the same amount of power-
conveying wealth. This is because Emma receives the benefit of five ex-
emptions, one per year, and the ability to use the lowest rates five times dur-
ing five separate trips up the rate ladder. In contrast, Dennis only benefits 
from one exemption and one trip up the rate schedule. A progressive acces-
sions tax, however, would treat Dennis and Emma the same; during their 
lifetimes, each would receive one exemption and one trip up the rate ladder 
regardless of the timing of their receipts. 
Moreover, under an annual inheritance tax, donors who divide their 
transfers to the same recipient temporally obtain the same advantage as 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Batchelder, supra note 2, at 3 & n.8 (citing Lily L. Batchelder & Surachai Khitatrakun, 
Dead or Alive: An Investigation of the Incidence of Estate and Inheritance Taxes 41 tbl.A14 
(Third Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Papers, Working Draft, Oct. 28, 2008)). 
Even though the estate tax is technically imposed on the decedent’s estate, it is effectively paid by 
heirs, who receive less than they would in the absence of tax. Id. at 7, 53–54. 
 55 Alstott, supra note 1, at 502. 
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those who divide their transfers among multiple recipients. Dennis’s father 
Frank, for example, could obtain better tax results simply by staggering his 
gifts to Dennis. Yet temporally dividing transfers to one recipient does not 
serve the goal of minimizing dynastic wealth transfers as much as dividing 
one’s estate among a greater number of recipients. 
Another type of inheritance tax is imposed by several states.56 Despite 
the name, this tax is actually a hybrid between an estate tax and an inher-
itance tax; it taxes the decedent at rates that vary depending on to whom the 
property passes.57 Transfers to immediate relatives such as children and 
parents are typically either totally exempt from tax or taxed at an extremely 
low rate with a large per-beneficiary exemption.58 Transfers to other rela-
tives are taxed at a somewhat higher rate and have a medium-sized exemp-
tion.59 Finally, transfers to strangers and very distant relatives are taxed at 
the highest rates and have the smallest exemption.60 To the extent these tax-
es have a per-beneficiary exemption, they might—like an accessions tax—
encourage transferors to divide their estates more widely.61 On the other 
hand, the fact that transfers to immediate relatives are either untaxed or 
taxed less heavily than bequests to more distant relatives and strangers 
could encourage decedents to scatter their wealth less widely. Lastly, this 
type of inheritance tax—in contrast to an accessions tax—does not reflect 
the intuition that recipients of greater total amounts of wealth should bear 
more tax than recipients of lower total amounts of wealth. This is so be-
cause each transfer is taxed in a vacuum, without regard to transfers re-
ceived from other individuals.62 
In addition to its superiority over various forms of inheritance taxes, an 
accessions tax is also superior to changing the income tax treatment of gifts 
and bequests if the goal is curbing the transmission of dynastic wealth. 
Consider requiring inclusion of gifts and bequests in income. Like an annu-
                                                                                                                           
 56 See Scott Drenkard & Richard Borean, Does Your State Have an Estate or Inheritance 
Tax?, TAX FOUND. (May 5, 2015), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/does-your-state-have-estate-or-
inheritance-tax [https://perma.cc/LW3D-BV3R]. Currently Nebraska, Iowa, Kentucky, Pennsyl-
vania, New Jersey, and Maryland impose state inheritance taxes. Id. 
 57 See id. 
 58 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 450.2, 450.9 to 450.10 (West 2006); KY. REV. STAT. 
§§ 140.010, 140.070 to 140.080 (West 2010); NEB. REV. STAT §§ 77-2001, -2004 to -2006 
(2009). In discussing the exemption levels, “large,” “medium,” and “small” refer to the size of the 
exemption levels relative to each other, not some absolute conception of size. 
 59 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 60 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 61 Kentucky and Nebraska have such structures. See KY. REV. STAT. §§ 104.070, 140.080 
(assigning a per-beneficiary exemption); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2004 (also granting a per-
beneficiary exemption). 
 62 Many of the states using this model do not have a separate gift tax, which compounds the 
effects of looking at these bequests in a vacuum. See Wendy C. Gerzog, What’s Wrong with a 
Federal Inheritance Tax?, 49 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 163, 175 (2014).  
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al inheritance tax, this option fails to reflect the fact that amounts received 
over one’s entire lifetime—not just during one calendar year—affect one’s 
ability to exert influence and power. Moreover, the highest marginal income 
tax rate currently kicks in at $415,050,63 which is much lower than an ex-
emption intended to exclude from taxation transfers too small to convey 
power and influence. The low exemption would render the tax a flat rate 
tax, which less accurately reflects the notion that increasing amounts of 
wealth bring with them the increased ability to exert power and influence 
over others.64 
Nor does making death a realization event or instituting carryover ba-
sis for bequests satisfactorily serve the goal of minimizing the transfer of 
dynastic wealth. Proponents accurately assert that such reforms would tax 
unrealized appreciation, large amounts of which currently escape tax due to 
the current exemption level and carryover basis.65 If one’s goal for imple-
menting a transfer tax structure is to raise revenue, increase progressivity 
generally, or backstop the income tax system, then these reforms serve those 
goals.66 But these reforms track the goal of combatting the transmission of 
dynastic wealth less effectively. Most importantly, these reforms tax indi-
viduals the same regardless of how they divide their wealth, thus falling 
prey to the main drawback of an estate tax. 
Second, both latter reforms miss the mark by focusing on unrealized 
appreciation. Although it is true that appreciated assets comprise the majori-
ty of extremely large estates, appreciated assets are not the sole component 
of such estates. Cash and high-basis assets also have the potential to yield 
power over others. Taxing unrealized appreciation while allowing cash and 
high-basis assets to pass free of tax does not accurately measure the poten-
tial for power over others that is conveyed. 
A last reason why implementing carryover basis for bequests does a 
poor job addressing the concern that large amounts of wealth can equate to 
power over others is the fact that tax on any unrealized appreciation is trig-
gered only if a transferee sells the inherited assets. But someone who re-
ceives a substantial amount of appreciated assets need not sell to exert polit-
                                                                                                                           
 63 This is the point at which the top rate of 39.6% begins in 2016. See Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 
2015-14 I.R.B 7. 
 64 Batchelder’s solution in the comprehensive income tax proposal—taxing gifts and bequests 
at a rate equal to the recipient’s top rate plus 15%—does not remedy this problem. See Batchelder, 
supra note 2, at 4. In that proposal, the tax burden turns on other characteristics of the recipient—
her income—instead of her cumulative amount of gratuitous receipts. See id. at 4, 17–22. 
 65 See Dodge, supra note 43, at 430–34; Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46 
VAND. L. REV. 361, 364, 367 (1993). 
 66 As Joseph Dodge has recognized, the income tax is better suited to the goal of preventing 
the accumulation of wealth by the earner in the first instance than a transfer tax. Dodge, Replac-
ing, supra note 5, at 1002. 
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ical and economic power. To exert political power in the form of political 
and issue advocacy spending, the individual can borrow against those as-
sets. Moreover, economic power—if it is in the form of stock in a privately-
held company or a control or swing vote bloc of a public company—is bet-
ter maintained if the recipient does not sell the property at issue. By perpet-
uating lock-in, applying carryover basis to such bequests exacerbates the 
economic control issue. 
C. Fairness Issues 
Some might argue that an accessions tax, as opposed to an estate tax, is 
unfair to families with fewer descendants. This argument stems from the 
fact that an accessions tax will tax a $50 million family fortune split be-
tween two children more heavily than a $50 million fortune split among 
five children, whereas an estate tax does not differentiate between the two 
families. Put another way, the former family will have to look further afield 
to find distant relatives or unrelated individuals to whom it could make be-
quests in order to obtain the same tax consequences as the latter family. 
This objection, however, misses the mark. The point of this and other 
accessions tax proposals is to encourage the dispersion of wealth.67 In larger 
families with more children the dispersion is more likely to occur naturally. 
In contrast, smaller families with fewer children are less likely to have the 
natural dispersion that occurs in larger families. Moreover, this objection 
focuses on the transferor, not the transferee.68 But the transferor and the 
transferor’s wealth is not the proper point of comparison if one’s concern is 
the transfer of power-conveying wealth. The proper focus is on whether or 
not a transferee gratuitously receives such wealth. From a transferee’s per-
spective, an accessions tax treats all individuals who inherit a given sum of 
money the same, regardless of the number of transferors from whom they 
inherit. 
III. DESIGN ISSUES 
Although a fully worked-out accessions tax proposal is impossible to 
sketch in this short Article, this Part touches on the most important design 
issues that arise. Section A of this Part focuses on exemption levels.69 Sec-
tion B addresses the rate structure.70 Section C looks at generation-skipping 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 1, at 503; Andrews, supra note 44, at 617; Dodge, Replacing, 
supra note 5, at 1004; Rudick, supra note 5, at 168. 
 68 Batchelder, supra note 2, at 77–78. 
 69 See infra notes 77–80 and accompanying text. 
 70 See infra notes 81–88 and accompanying text. 
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transfers.71 Section D analyzes transfers in trust.72 Section E analyzes chari-
table transfers.73 Section F focuses on liquidity provisions for family busi-
nesses.74 Section G analyzes attribution and amalgamation.75 Finally, sec-
tion H deals with administrative concerns.76 
A. The Exemption Level and an Annual Exclusion 
This Article suggests a per-recipient exemption level that is much 
higher than under current law, something along the lines of $10 million or 
$20 million. Although these sums will strike many readers as extraordinari-
ly high, one should keep in mind the goal of this proposal. This proposal is 
only concerned with the transfer of sums of wealth large enough to convey 
power and influence upon the recipient, and not with traditional equality-of-
opportunity principles. A gratuitous transfer of $5 million undoubtedly al-
lows the transferee to enjoy an extremely luxurious lifestyle and to pass that 
lifestyle on to future generations. It also provides a variety of advantages in 
developing one’s talents, from private schools, lessons and camps; to col-
lege and graduate school; to seed money for a small business. 
A transfer of that size, however, does not convey power and influence 
over others. Although it may allow the recipient to make more political and 
§ 501(c)(4) contributions than otherwise, it does not allow the recipient to 
make substantial, sustained contributions from income alone. It therefore 
does not transmit such political power down from generation to generation. 
With respect to economic power, any business valued under $5 million 
will be relatively small. Imagine a mechanic shop that employs five people. 
When the owner dies and leaves it to his son, the son now runs the shop. It 
might seem that the parent has transmitted power over those employees to 
his son. But given the small scale of the operation, the shop owner does not 
have power over the employees in the monopolistic sense with which this 
Article is concerned. Presumably there are competing auto shops in the ar-
ea, and employees and customers could go elsewhere if the son—the new 
owner—did not treat them well. But the calculus changes when we are talk-
ing about a tire factory that employs five thousand people in a town of six 
thousand adults. Now whoever owns the tire factory has much more influ-
ence over the lives of the town. 
For these reasons, the exemption level in an accessions tax geared to 
combat the transmission of power would be higher than in an accessions tax 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See infra notes 89–94 and accompanying text. 
 72 See infra notes 95–132 and accompanying text. 
 73 See infra notes 133–142 and accompanying text. 
 74 See infra notes 143–146 and accompanying text. 
 75 See infra notes 147–148 and accompanying text. 
 76 See infra notes 149–155 and accompanying text. 
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designed to reflect traditional equality-of-opportunity principles.77 Although 
the choice of exemption level will be somewhat arbitrary, an exemption of 
something like $10 million or even $20 million per recipient seems appro-
priate. 
In addition to the lifetime exemption amount, this Article also proposes 
that each transferee have an annual exclusion of $14,000 for gifts received 
and an annual exclusion of $100,000 for bequests received.78 Transferees 
with gratuitous receipts for a given year under this threshold would not be 
required to file an accessions tax return or keep track of such receipts. Fur-
ther, these receipts would not count toward a recipient’s $10 million or $20 
million exemption. The main purpose of this proposal mirrors that of the 
annual exclusion under current law, which is to render keeping track of eve-
ry day gifts such as those for birthdays, holidays, weddings, graduations, 
and so on, unnecessary.79 It also means that a large portion of those receiv-
ing bequests would not be required to file an accessions tax return, thus re-
ducing administrability concerns.80 
B. The Rate Structure 
The accessions tax should impose increasing marginal rates based on 
the cumulative amount of gratuitous receipts the transferee has received 
during his or her or her life.81 So doing reflects the notion that the more 
wealth one has, the more power and influence that wealth likely generates. 
Someone who has received $50 million over the course of his or her life-
time, for example, likely has more power than someone who has received 
the smaller sum of $10 million. 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See Rakowski, supra note 6, at 292 (explaining that preventing transmission of power 
would require a tax on only a small segment of the most wealthy Americans). 
 78 Cf. Batchelder, supra note 2, at 64 (suggesting an annual per-recipient exclusion of $13,000 
for gifts and $65,000 for bequests). Both figures should be adjusted for inflation each year, as the 
current annual exclusion is under current law. 
 79 Most past accessions tax proposals also contain some type of annual exclusion. See, e.g., 
Batchelder, supra note 2, at 64; Dodge, Replacing, supra note 5, at 1026–27; Harry J. Rudick, A 
Proposal for an Accessions Tax, 1 TAX L. REV 25, 41–42 (1945). Accessions structured as period-
ic payments instead of lump sums (such as annuities and income interests in trusts) would be al-
lowed only one annual exclusion, to discourage donors from restructuring gifts to take advantage 
of multi-year exclusions. See Halbach, supra note 44, at 212, 235–361; Rudick, supra, at 42. 
 80 See Batchelder, supra note 2, at 64 (suggesting that a $65,000 annual exclusion for be-
quests would eliminate reporting requirements for more than two-thirds of heirs). 
 81 Most past accessions tax proposals also suggest increasing marginal rates. See ALI Pro-
posal, supra note 5, at 460–62; Alstott, supra note 1, at 504–05; Dodge, Replacing, supra note 5, 
at 999, 1009. But see Batchelder, supra note 2, at 4 (suggesting that gratuitous receipts be taxed at 
a rate equal to the recipient’s top marginal income tax rate plus 15%); Halbach, supra note 44, at 
231 (suggesting a flat rate accessions tax). 
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A second key feature of an accessions tax designed to minimize trans-
fers of power-conveying wealth is that it would tax receipts from close rela-
tives more heavily than other gratuitous transfers.82 This contrasts with 
most existing accessions and inheritance taxes, which tax such transfers less 
heavily than those from more distant relatives and unrelated individuals.83 
Giving more favorable treatment to transfers to close relatives, however, 
simply provides additional encouragement for transferors to do what cus-
tom and instinct likely lead them to do anyway. In contrast, taxing receipts 
from close relatives more heavily is meant to encourage donors to spread 
their wealth more widely than they otherwise might by making transfers not 
only to lineal descendants, but also to more distant relatives and friends.84 
How would this be implemented? First, this proposal would consider 
lineal ascendants, lineal descendants, siblings, and spouses of the foregoing 
of both the transferor and the transferor’s spouse as immediate relatives to 
be taxed at the higher rate. Second, it would tax transfers to other individu-
als, such as cousins, nieces and nephews, and friends, at half the rate.85 As a 
technical matter, this would be done using one rate schedule and giving 
each transferee a fifty percent deduction for receipts from that latter set of 
relatives.86 Implementing a system of dual rates using a deduction mirrors 
the treatment of marital transfers between 1948 and 1981 as well as the 
proposal outlined by the American Law Institute (“ALI”) in 1969.87 Trans-
fers between spouses, however, would continue to be exempt from taxation 
as they are under current law.88 
C. Generation-Skipping Transfers 
Because this Article’s proposal is concerned with the transfer of large 
wealth concentrations, and not their existence per se, it would impose no 
additional penalty on generation-skipping transfers—in contrast to most 
past accessions tax proposals. The ALI proposal, for example, suggests tax-
                                                                                                                           
 82 This Article’s proposal would not, however, differentiate among transferees based upon 
their age. This contrasts with Alstott’s equality-of-opportunity-focused accessions tax. See Alstott, 
supra note 1, at 525–27 (differentiating transferees based on their age). 
 83 See, e.g., ALI Proposal, supra note 5, at 446, 460–68; supra notes 56–62 and accompany-
ing text (discussing inheritance taxes in several states). 
 84 Because she believes it better reflects the choice-versus-chance distinction, Alstott also 
proposes taxing receipts from close relatives more heavily than those from distant relatives and 
friends. See Alstott, supra note 1, at 507–11. 
 85 Setting the lower rate at 50% may be arbitrary, but it has precedence in the old marital 
deduction provisions. 
 86 The rate schedule would reflect the rate chosen for transfers to immediate relatives. 
 87 ALI Proposal, supra note 5, at 460–68. 
 88 Almost all past proposals exempt spousal transfers. See, e.g., Dodge, Replacing, supra note 
5, at 1028; Rudick, supra note 79, at 41. 
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ing transfers to children less heavily than transfers to grandchildren in order 
to discourage the latter.89 That suggestion’s motivation appears to be the 
goal of preventing wealth concentrations by taxing wealth as such. As the 
author William Andrews argues, “an accessions tax—or any other transfer 
tax—operates as a periodic capital levy, the periodicity being determined by 
the frequency with which the property is transferred.”90 Andrews further 
reasons that keying a tax off the triggering act of transferring property is a 
convenient moment for imposing tax, but that the aggregate tax burden it-
self should not depend on how many times the property has been trans-
ferred.91 
On one hand, Andrews is correct. If the goal of taxing wealth transfers 
is actually to tax wealth as such, either to raise revenue or to minimize how 
much wealth remains in private hands, then the number of times it is trans-
ferred should not matter. Instead, taxes should be imposed at regular inter-
vals to slow the accumulation of further wealth, much the same way that 
smaller snowballs grow more slowly than larger snowballs when rolled in 
the snow. On this view, a tax on generation-skipping transfers is appropri-
ate.92 
In contrast, if the goal behind the tax has something to do with how 
many people enjoy the wealth in question, then the number of transfers does 
matter. Alstott recognizes this in her discussion of generation-skipping and 
equality of opportunity.93 As she notes, if the tax’s goal is to minimize the 
advantages recipients of wealth have in achieving their plans for the good 
life, then what matters is how many different people receive that advantage 
from the wealth.94 Along those lines, if the goal of the tax is minimizing the 
transfer of dynastic wealth (due to the troubling implication of allowing 
power and influence to pass to one’s heirs), then the number of transfers 
should matter. If a grandfather gives $50 million to his grandson but skips 
over his son, then he has made only one transfer of influence-yielding 
wealth. If the grandfather first gives $50 million to his son, who in turn 
leaves it to the grandson, then two people enjoy the influence that comes 
                                                                                                                           
 89 ALI Proposal, supra note 5, at 460–68. Most, but not all, other accessions or inheritance tax 
proposals contain a generation-skipping penalty. Compare Batchelder, supra note 2, at 79–81 
(suggesting generation-skipping penalties), and Halbach, supra note 44, at 214–15 (same), with 
Alstott, supra note 1, at 516–21 (rejecting a generation-skipping penalty), and Dodge, Replacing, 
supra note 5, at 1011, 1045–46 (same). 
 90 ALI Proposal, supra note 5, at 475. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Edward Halbach’s proposal contains a generation-skipping tax for similar reasons. Hal-
bach, supra note 44, at 215 (“The goal [of a transfer tax] . . . is . . . to impose a like tax burden on 
a family whether it uses skips or passes property outright from generation to generation.”). 
 93 Alstott, supra note 1, at 517–19. 
 94 Id. 
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with that accumulation of wealth and two people should be taxed. To that 
end, this Article’s proposals eschew additional taxes on generation-skipping 
penalties. 
D. Transfers in Trust 
In addition to the generation-skipping issue, transfers in trust raise two 
additional considerations. Both concerns proceed from the decision by most 
accessions tax proposals to consider trust distributions—instead of an earli-
er event, like the creation or vesting of trust interests—as the accession that 
triggers tax.95 The driving forces behind this decision are the administrative 
concerns of valuation and liquidity.96 Although some trust interests can be 
sold or borrowed against, many cannot, which would make paying the tax 
difficult if assessed before distribution. Valuation difficulties abound be-
yond those normally associated with the actuarial tables. Even if a remain-
der is vested, valuation may be contingent if additional beneficiaries may 
enter the class, as they may by birth. Additionally, many interests are sub-
ject to trustee discretion (such as a remainder “to my children as the trustee 
determines is in their best interests”), rendering valuation essentially impos-
sible. 
The first consideration explored in subsection 1 is whether creation, 
vesting, or distribution is the conceptually proper moment of accession 
(apart from administrative concerns).97 If creation or vesting should theoret-
ically be deemed an accession, then treating distributions as accessions con-
stitutes a deferral of taxation that some commentators argue have potential-
ly troubling implications. As explored below, treating distribution as the 
accession is, as a theoretical matter, frequently too late. In many instances, a 
trust interest allows a beneficiary to wield power and influence before dis-
tribution. The second consideration, addressed in subsection 2, is the poten-
tially higher tax burden on the beneficiary when distribution instead of 
some earlier point in time is treated as the accession.98 
                                                                                                                           
 95 See, e.g., ALI Proposal, supra note 5, at 509; Batchelder, supra note 2, at 65; Halbach, 
supra note 44, at 236; Rudick, supra note 5, at 169. 
 96 See ALI Proposal, supra note 5, at 522–25 (discussing the difficulties created by valuation 
and liquidity). An additional benefit of treating distribution as the taxable accession is that provi-
sions such as I.R.C. §§ 2036–2038 (2012) would largely be unnecessary. See Rudick, supra note 
79, at 34. 
 97 See infra notes 99–129 and accompanying text. 
 98 See infra notes 130–132 and accompanying text. 
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1. Is Creation, Vesting, or Distribution the Conceptually Ideal Accession? 
As a theoretical matter, whether creation, vesting, or distribution is the 
point at which an accession should be deemed to occur depends on the goal 
of the accessions tax. One could argue that if the goal of an accessions tax is 
to mimic a periodic wealth tax, then the theoretically natural time of taxa-
tion is upon vesting for two reasons. First, in many instances, the benefi-
ciary does receive a valuable property right upon the vesting of a trust inter-
est. This enhances the transferee’s wealth, even if its valuation is imprecise. 
Second, treating vesting as the taxable event prevents the possibility that 
taxation of trust assets could be deferred for great lengths of time, as would 
be the case if distribution was treated as the taxable event. This delay, which 
could last generations, would undercut the point of the tax. Given the valua-
tion and liquidity difficulties of taxing trust interests at creation, however, it 
seems reasonable to defer taxation until distribution (as most accessions 
proposals suggest).99 To compensate the government for the loss associated 
with deferral due to the time value of money, many such proposals suggest 
imposing a special tax on large trusts upon creation.100 The tax basically 
works as pre-payment; credits are allowed against later distributions from 
the trust.101 
In contrast, an accessions tax designed to further equality-of-
opportunity principles by reflecting the choice-versus-chance distinction 
would not necessarily treat the creation of trust interests as the theoretical 
point of accession.102 Here, one might initially think that trust beneficiaries 
should be taxed when trust interests enable them to alter their life plans. 
Alstott, however, argues that a blanket rule treating trust creation as the time 
of accession inaccurately reflects the choice-versus-chance distinction.103 In 
her view, if the beneficiary lacks control over the disposition or investment 
of assets, then the ultimate amount distributed to the beneficiary is as much 
a matter of luck (from the transferee’s perspective) as the amount funded at 
creation. It would therefore be better to theoretically tax such interests at 
distribution, but tax other interests at the point when the beneficiary “has 
the capacity to make a choice about the disposition or investment of her 
                                                                                                                           
 99 See ALI Proposal, supra note 5, at 522–25. 
 100 These proposals do not view this deferral as problematic in the case of small trusts, since 
the deferral is offset by the bracket creep discussed infra notes 130–132. On the whole, these theo-
rists argue, the government ends up in roughly the same position either way. See ALI Proposal, 
supra note 5, at 512–13. Deferral benefits the government if the corpus outperforms the prevailing 
interest rate at creation or if the life beneficiary dies earlier than the tables predict; it hurts the 
government if the life beneficiary lives longer than predicted or if the trust assets underperform. 
See id. 
 101 ALI Proposal, supra note 5, at 545. 
 102 See Alstott, supra note 1, at 533–36. 
 103 Id. at 535–36. 
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deferred interest.”104 This reflects the notion that what the beneficiary ini-
tially receives is a matter of luck, but that the later performance of the trust 
assets stems from the beneficiary’s choices with respect to those assets.105 
When should a trust interest be considered an accession in an acces-
sions tax whose concern is the transfer of large wealth concentrations and 
their accompanying influence and power? In theory, an accessions tax so 
designed would treat the point at which the trust interest enhances the hold-
er’s influence and power as the appropriate time for taxation. In some cases, 
this is when the beneficiary obtains ownership of the interest. In other cases, 
the beneficiary may have something that is not yet tantamount to ownership 
but nevertheless gives him or her power and influence. This, of course, will 
turn on the terms of the trust. Various alternatives are discussed below. 
a. Vested Income Interests 
Practicalities aside, in most instances, the creation of a trust interest 
should be considered the accession that enhances the transferee’s power and 
influence. Consider Iris, who is the income beneficiary for life of a $10 mil-
lion trust.106 Although Iris does not receive $10 million outright, she does 
receive a steady, annual income stream. Assuming a five percent interest 
rate, each year Iris can expect $500,000. Politicians, charities, businesses 
seeking funding, and others would quite likely begin courting her at the 
trust’s creation, hoping to obtain some of her largesse as she receives distri-
butions. Because the courting would likely begin immediately, as a theoreti-
cal matter, the vesting of her income interest should be considered the time 
of accession. 
That said, taxing the value of Iris’s income interest at vesting presents 
potential liquidity concerns.107 To that end, it seems reasonable to offer Iris 
a choice: she can pay tax now, or treat each distribution as an accession, 
with interest added to reflect the deferral.108 If Iris defers, she faces another 
choice. Due to the progressive rate tables, a higher rate of tax may be im-
posed on later distributions solely because of their growth from the time 
value of money. The ALI proposal suggested that income beneficiaries be 
                                                                                                                           
 104 Id. 
 105 See id. 
 106 This analysis applies whether Iris receives all the income, or income from an ascertainable 
standard such as her health, education, maintenance, and support. 
 107 Valuation concerns—in the case of non-discretionary interests such as Iris’s—can be 
overcome by the use of the valuation tables. 
 108 If a beneficiary who chooses deferral sells his or her interest, the sale should be treated as 
a taxable accession. See ALI Proposal, supra note 5, at 529; Halbach, supra note 44, at 236; 
Rudick, supra note 79, at 39. In contrast, if a beneficiary disclaims or assigns her interest before 
receiving a distribution, he or she should not be treated as having had an accession. See Halbach, 
supra note 44, at 236. 
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allowed to elect a single rate of tax, based on the actuarial value of their 
interest, at the time of vesting that would apply throughout the trust.109 That 
option seems reasonable here. 
b. Vested Remainder Interests 
Vested remainder interests are somewhat similar, in that Iris is likely 
going to be courted by those seeking her favor long before she actually re-
ceives the trust corpus. In theory, the point at which such courting begins 
should be considered the taxable event, for that is when she can start to ex-
ert her power and influence. One cannot know, of course, how long before 
distribution of the corpus that courting will begin. If the lead interest is a 
life estate, and the measuring life is still fairly young, it could be decades 
before Iris receives anything. It seems unlikely a charity or politician would 
court her now in the hopes of receiving donations from her twenty or thirty 
years hence. But those seeking handouts from Iris will likely begin vying 
for her attention a few years before she expects to receive the trust assets; 
wooing large donors takes time. 
This presents a dilemma. It seems premature to treat trust creation as 
the time of accession for remainder interests when the courting likely will 
not start until a few years before distribution. On the other hand, waiting 
until distributions seems too late. Perhaps one approach would be to pick a 
date a few years before distribution—perhaps three, perhaps five—and peg 
that as the time of accession. Tax due could be calculated but deferred, with 
interest, until distribution due to liquidity concerns.110  
This default rule should not apply, however, if a beneficiary monetizes 
a vested yet undistributed interest. Although unlikely, imagine that Iris can 
borrow against or sell her vested remainder interest that pays out in ten 
years. If she does so, she can now use those assets to exercise power and 
influence. To that end, monetization of an interest should also be deemed a 
distribution.111 
 The fungibility of money should also be briefly considered. Knowing 
that one will receive regular future trust distributions might free one up to 
make more political expenditures in a given year than otherwise. Continue 
to assume that Iris holds a remainder interest due in Year Ten. Might she 
decide to make more political contributions in Years One or Two in antici-
pation of that remainder? Possibly. That said, she must still finance both her 
                                                                                                                           
 109 ALI Proposal, supra note 5, at 494–501. 
 110 Of course, Iris could always elect to pay tax at the imputed vesting date. 
 111 See ALI Proposal, supra note 5, at 529. 
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political expenditures and her daily expenses out of her current assets.112 
Unless she can somehow monetize the trust remainder in the present, the 
remainder is not freeing up current funds for political expenditures.113 
c. Discretionary Interests 
Determining the proper treatment when Iris is simply one of a number 
of discretionary beneficiaries is more difficult.114 Imagine that Iris’s grand-
father creates a trust with income to be distributed among Iris’s father and 
his children as the trustee determines. The remainder is then to be paid to 
Iris and her siblings at her father’s death as the trustee directs. On one hand, 
this expectancy likely gives Iris some influence. One can imagine, for ex-
ample, Iris holding court with those hoping to obtain contributions from her 
if and when she does receive trust distributions. On the other hand, this in-
fluence is much more indirect than when Iris is guaranteed trust distribu-
tions. Further, the value of a discretionary trust interest is impossible to cal-
culate. 
For these reasons, Iris should not be taxed until she actually receives a 
distribution. This is not a theoretically perfect rule. Assume, for example, 
that the trustee splits the income up equally between the trust beneficiaries 
each year. In that case, Iris likely has more clout than if the trustee only dis-
tributes income to her sporadically. But crafting a rule that attempts to pin-
point when past practice becomes more than an expectancy on Iris’s part is 
essentially impossible. Moreover, given the liquidity relief suggested for 
those who receive vested income interests, the timing of tax with respect to 
discretionary interests will be somewhat close to that imposed upon vested 
interests. 
                                                                                                                           
 112 This assumes, of course, that she either cannot borrow against her vested remainder inter-
est or can borrow only small amounts. If a beneficiary does somehow monetize a trust interest, for 
example by selling it or borrowing against it, the act of monetization should be deemed an acces-
sion. 
 113 It is possible that Iris might decide to save less for the future knowing that she will come 
into the remainder. Given the riskiness of this decision (due to the multitude of variables that will 
affect the remainder’s value at payout), it is unclear how many people will make extremely large 
changes in their spending habits. Perhaps Iris would make only minimal political expenditures in 
the absence of a trust. How realistic is it to think that upon learning she is the remainder benefi-
ciary of a trust Iris suddenly makes enormous political expenditures of the type usually made only 
by the very wealthy? 
 114 This analysis assumes that Iris is neither trustee nor has another means of directing distri-
butions to herself, such as a power of appointment. This Article proposes retaining the existing 
rules governing when trustee powers should be imputed to others. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. 
§ 20.2036-1 (2015) (including in a decedent’s estate transfers in which the decedent has retained 
either an income interest or the ability to determine who shall enjoy the income from the trans-
ferred property); id. § 20.2038-1 (2015) (similarly including revocable transfers); id. § 20.2041-1 
(2015) (addressing the inclusion of powers of appointment); id. § 20.2041-3 (2015) (same). 
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d. Beneficiaries Are Trustees 
The foregoing has assumed that beneficiaries are not trustees. If a ben-
eficiary is also trustee, does that change the analysis? It does not, if the trus-
tee’s discretion is limited to basic administrative powers. Imagine, for ex-
ample, that a trust provides that income be distributed to Jack for ten years, 
with remainder being paid to Iris. If Iris is trustee, she is largely just carry-
ing out the trustor’s wishes. True, she could somewhat influence how much 
each beneficiary receives by investing in assets that produce either more or 
less income, but even that ability is limited by fiduciary duties. She may 
also wield some influence in the business world by deciding where to in-
vest,115 but again, fiduciary duties limit that ability.116 These types of trustee 
powers have never been considered enough to impute ownership; a gran-
tor’s retention of such powers is not enough to run afoul of the string provi-
sions, for example.117 Nor do such administrative powers, standing alone, 
constitute a general power of appointment.118 The power and influence Iris 
has with respect to the trust stems largely from the fact that she will receive 
the remainder, not from her ability to manage the assets. 
Moving on from basic administrative powers, next consider a situation 
in which Iris has more discretion, but still cannot directly exercise that dis-
cretion to benefit herself. Assume that the trust provides that all income be 
paid to Jack or Katherine in such proportions as the trustee determines, with 
the remainder being paid to Iris. Iris remains trustee. Here, Iris now has 
some control over Jack and Katherine, who may be inclined to do her bid-
ding in order to receive a larger income distribution. Even so, this should 
not be enough to constitute an accession by Iris for two reasons. First, she 
has not acceded to a beneficial interest in the income; her beneficial interest 
is in the remainder. Second, her power to choose between Jack and Kathe-
rine only gives her internal power—not external power in the sense of in-
fluence over economic and political affairs. It is the latter with which this 
Article is concerned.119 
                                                                                                                           
 115 Perhaps, for example, by deciding whether to invest in Startup A or Startup B.  
 116 See infra notes 122–129 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unique circum-
stances in which investment power does generate enough economic power to count as an acces-
sion. 
 117 Of course, if a grantor retains an income interest in a trust, he or she runs afoul of § 2036. 
See I.R.C. § 2036 (2012) (including in a decedent’s gross estate the full value of trusts in which 
the decedent has retained an income interest). But in that case, it is the income interest and not the 
trustee powers that trigger taxation. See id. 
 118 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1 (stating that mere power of management or investment, con-
strained by standard fiduciary duties, is generally not a power of appointment). 
 119 When Jack and Katherine receive the assets, however, that should be considered acces-
sions to them from the creator of the power. 
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e. Powers of Appointment 
Consider what happens if Iris has a power of appointment over the 
trust assets. First assume that Iris can invade the trust for her health, educa-
tion, maintenance, and support (“HEMS”). Given Iris’s enforceable interest, 
this should theoretically be treated the same as when Iris has a vested in-
come interest in the trust. The distinguishing factor, however, is valuation. 
Valuing what portion of the trust is needed for her HEMS, especially at the 
trust’s outset, is extremely imprecise—much more so than the estimates 
generated by the valuation tables for mandatory income and remainder in-
terests. Distributions for HEMS will have a much wider variance from ini-
tial estimates than mandatory, non-discretionary trust distributions. It seems 
unfair to tax Iris on an amount that could be so much more than what she 
may ultimately receive.120 Thus, for valuation reasons, HEMS interests 
should be taxed at distribution. 
Alternatively, assume Iris has a general power of appointment, mean-
ing that Iris has the discretionary ability to invade the trust assets for her-
self. In this situation, what Iris has is tantamount to ownership over the as-
sets and she can immediately use them for whatever purpose she wishes. 
Her immediate access gives Iris power and influence outside the trust. To 
that end, this proposal follows most others in treating receipt of a general 
power of appointment as an accession.121 
A trickier case is when a beneficiary has a non-general power of ap-
pointment that is not limited in scope. Imagine that Iris has the ability to 
invade the corpus for the benefit of anyone other than herself, her estate, her 
creditors, or the creditors of her estate. Here, Iris cannot technically use the 
assets for her own benefit. Nevertheless, her ability to decide who else will 
benefit from the assets likely gives her substantial power and influence; im-
agine entrepreneurs seeking funds for their start-ups or fundraisers seeking 
donations for § 501(c)(4) organizations. An argument could therefore be 
made that these types of non-general powers should be considered acces-
sions if used to direct assets outside the immediate family unit. 
                                                                                                                           
 120 To be sure, the actuarial tables used for valuing non-discretionary income and remainder 
interests are estimates. The amount actually paid out to a beneficiary will never precisely match 
the estimated value of an income interest at accession, due to investment risk, market conditions, 
and changing rates of return. 
 121 See, e.g., ALI Proposal, supra note 5, at 534; Halbach, supra note 44, at 237; Rudick, 
supra note 79, at 39 (noting that if a donee is given the “unrestricted power to invade principal . . . 
[t]he statute could and should provide that such a transfer be treated the same as an outright trans-
fer”). But see Dodge, Replacing, supra note 5, at 1043 (arguing that receipt of a power of ap-
pointment should not count as an accession). Harry Rudick limits this to income beneficiaries who 
can invade corpus for themselves. See Rudick, supra note 79, at 42. This author does not see why 
this rule should apply only when income beneficiaries have this ability. 
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f. Extraordinary Control and the Special Estate Tax 
As discussed above, the proper time to impute an accession varies ac-
cording to the terms of the trust. When creation is the theoretical point of 
accession, as is the case for a vested income interest, the amount of control 
a beneficiary has over the trust assets is irrelevant. The beneficial interest 
itself is enough to trigger an accession. But if the beneficial interest, stand-
ing alone, suggests that a later point is the proper time at which to impose a 
tax, then it matters whether a beneficiary has additional control over the 
trust assets. This is so because some types of additional control bestow 
power and influence upon the trust beneficiary, suggesting that the time 
when an accession theoretically occurs is earlier than that triggered solely 
by the beneficial interest. 
In those situations, this Article suggests that a special estate tax could 
be imposed whenever assets are transferred to a trust and the trust benefi-
ciaries are somehow able to exercise substantial influence over those assets. 
The special tax would apply even if the rules discussed above would not 
impute an accession until a later point.122 This tax would later be credited 
against tax due upon an accession determined by the above rules.123 
A beneficiary can accede to this type of control over trust assets in two 
situations. The first occurs when a beneficiary is a trustee and by reason of 
that position can vote more than 10% of the stock of any given corpora-
tion.124 Both stock owned by the trust and by the beneficiary in his or her 
individual capacity would count toward the 10% limit. Imagine that Iris is 
trustee of a trust that owns 20% of X Corp.; Iris owns an additional 5% in 
her individual capacity. Iris now controls a block of X Corp. that most 
scholars believe is large enough for her to influence its affairs.125 Given that 
                                                                                                                           
 122 This Article borrows the idea of a special estate tax from the 1969 ALI proposal, which 
suggested a special estate tax for very large trusts, in order to combat what it viewed as problemat-
ic deferral. ALI Proposal, supra note 5, at 544–45 (proposing a special tax for trusts larger than 
$100,000); see also Halbach, supra note 44, at 217 (proposing a special tax on large estates simi-
lar to that of the ALI proposal). 
 123 Fleshing out the details of this special estate tax is beyond the scope of this short Article. 
For a detailed overview of another proposal for a special estate tax on certain transfers to trust, see 
ALI Proposal, supra note 5, at 544–57. For administrative critiques of the ALI’s proposed special 
tax, see Dodge, Replacing, supra note 5, at 1041–42. 
 124 Ten percent is chosen as the triggering proportion based on the 1940 Act regulating mutual 
funds. See generally Investment Companies Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80-64 (2012)) (creating definitions for what constitutes an invest-
ment company). 
 125 It is commonly accepted corporate law wisdom that a block of over 25% can control a 
large publicly-held company due to the dispersion of the other shareholders. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. 
& GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 80–84 (1932); 
AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
14–15 (1994). 
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combination of control and beneficial interest, the special estate tax should 
be imposed whenever a beneficiary who is also a trustee can vote more than 
10% of the shares of any company. This rule should apply whether or not 
the beneficiary is an employee of the company in question, and whether or 
not the corporate assets in question are privately or publicly held. 
The second situation occurs when the trust beneficiary has some con-
trol over trust assets due to reasons external to the trust itself. Business enti-
ties illustrate one instance in which this arises. Consider Lola, who owns 
100% of L Corp. Before her death Lola serves as L Corp.’s CEO; her two 
children, Max and Nina, also work there. If Lola leaves L Corp. to her chil-
dren outright, then Max and Nina will have taxable accessions upon receipt 
of their stock shares. Imagine that Lola instead establishes a trust, names 
Max and Nina the beneficiaries, and transfers her shares of L Corp. stock to 
the trust. Under the general rule outlined above, whether Max and Nina 
have a taxable accession upon creation would normally depend on the terms 
of the trust. But in this instance, regardless of the terms of the trust, Max 
and Nina do have some control over the assets even though they are held in 
trust. This control comes from their employment in the company. Again, it 
seems that some tax is appropriate upon creation because Lola has trans-
ferred assets to her children that they can control, even if the transfer to the 
children was of trust interests. 
Thus, the special estate tax should be triggered whenever a trust bene-
ficiary is a disqualified person with respect to trust assets, borrowing from 
the § 4958 rules.126 Those rules define disqualified persons as those who are 
in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of an organiza-
tion, such as directors, executives, and other individuals who have authority 
over large portions of an organization’s budget.127 Imagine that Max is the 
CFO of L Corp. and also a beneficiary of a trust holding L. Corp. stock. In 
that instance, Max benefits from the stock, due to his interest in the trust, 
and also has some control over that stock, due to his position in L. Corp. 
The creation of the trust, therefore, is the point in time at which Max ac-
cedes to both a beneficial interest in and control over the L. Corp. stock. 
This rule should apply whether or not the beneficiary in question is a trustee 
of the trust, because the control in this instance proceeds from Max’s direct 
                                                                                                                           
 126 See I.R.C. § 4958 (2012) (applying a special tax to excess benefit transactions). 
 127 See id. § 4958(f)(1)(A); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(c) (2015). In contrast to the § 4958 rules, 
however, this Article’s proposal would not deem someone to be a disqualified person simply due 
to their familial relationship to a disqualified person. See I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1)(B); Treas. Reg. 
§ 53.4958-3(b). 
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relationship to L. Corp. and not from any direct control over the trust it-
self.128 
Of course, many arrangements that may trigger the special estate tax 
will likely involve family farms and businesses. Special provisions to alle-
viate potential liquidity issues for family farms and businesses—whether 
caused by the special estate tax or the regular application of the accessions 
tax—are addressed below in section F.129 
2. Bracket Creep 
The choice at times to treat a point other than creation as the time of 
accession presents a further issue, one that involves the interaction of the 
passage of time, the time value of money, and graduated rate schedules. Im-
agine that in Year 1, Olive receives a ten-year vested remainder interest in a 
trust with a corpus of $613,913 that accumulates income instead of paying 
it out. Assuming a 5% growth rate, Olive will receive $1 million in Year 10. 
Applying a constant 50% tax rate, Olive should be indifferent between pay-
ing tax of $306,956.50 in Year 1 or $500,000 in Year 10. But given the fact 
of increasing marginal rates, Olive is not indifferent. If accessions over 
$750,000 are taxed at 60%, then Olive pays $525,000 upon distribution, an 
increase of $25,000 simply due to bracket creep.130 
To mitigate this effect, most accessions tax proposals allow certain 
trust beneficiaries to treat creation of their interest as a taxable accession. 
The ALI proposal, for example, would allow income beneficiaries to deter-
mine the tax due on the present value of the interest received, determine 
what rate of tax that represents, and then apply that flat rate to all future 
trust distributions.131 Moreover, for purposes of determining the rate appli-
cable to later accessions from other sources, the present value of the income 
interest upon receipt would be treated as the amount of the accession. The 
ALI proposal also suggests as an alternative allowing income beneficiaries 
                                                                                                                           
 128 Although this illustration uses a privately held company, this rule should apply in the case 
of publicly held companies as well. 
 129 See infra notes 143–146 and accompanying text. 
 130 For further explication of this problem, see ALI Proposal, supra note 5, at 494–500; Hal-
bach, supra note 44, at 250–52. 
 131 ALI Proposal, supra note 5, 494–500; see also Halbach, supra note 79, at 253 (proposing 
to allow beneficiaries to make an election to pay tax upon creation of a trust interest). But see 
Rudick, supra note 79, at 37–38 (proposing to apportion tax over the expected years of an income 
beneficiary’s life). Interestingly, Rudick later suggested that income beneficiaries be taxed at the 
rate that would have been applicable had they been left the full trust corpus outright. See Rudick, 
supra note 5, at 169. This results in a higher tax burden on the income beneficiary than under the 
first alternative. Id. at 172–73. 
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to elect to prepay the tax at any time.132 This seems sensible, and this Arti-
cle proposes the same elections. 
E. Transfers to Charity 
In keeping with the motivation behind this Article’s proposal—the 
transfer of power and influence—this accessions tax proposal does not au-
tomatically exempt transfers to charity from taxation.133 This contrasts with 
most past accessions tax proposals, which either do not discuss charitable 
transfers or do so only to note that transfers from charities to individuals 
should not be treated as accessions.134 Instead, this Article argues that a tax 
similar to the special estate tax discussed above should be levied on trans-
fers to charities controlled by a member of the transferor’s family, regard-
less of whether those charities are public charities or private foundations.135 
Such a tax is appropriate because—as has been more fully explored 
elsewhere—control of a charity enables one to exert both political and eco-
nomic influence.136 First, transfers to family controlled charities can give 
the family power over the fates of others through the family’s charitable 
work. Consider a family foundation. Decisions by a foundation about which 
grants to fund affect the operations of grant applicants, which in turn affect 
those individuals served by grant applicants. A decision to fund research on 
AIDS instead of diabetes, for example, may affect the health of those suffer-
ing from diabetes. Funding decisions about early childhood education, job 
training, and basic needs services like soup kitchens and homeless shelters 
directly impact the individuals served by charities requesting grants. Similar 
effects are felt when public charities make decisions about the level and 
quality of services to provide.137 In addition, transfers to family-controlled 
                                                                                                                           
 132 ALI Proposal, supra note 5, at 500. In both cases, the actuarial value of the income interest 
used to determine tax due would be treated as the amount of the accession for purposes of deter-
mining tax due on any later, separate accessions. Id. at 494. 
 133 For discussions of the charitable tax subsidies generally, see Miranda Perry Fleischer, 
Libertarianism and the Charitable Tax Subsidies, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1345 (2015); Miranda Perry 
Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 505 (2010). 
 134 See, e.g., Halbach, supra note 44, at 235 (“Receipts by charities would not be subject to 
the tax; and receipts by individuals from charities pursuant to their charitable purposes are also not 
accessions.”). 
 135 Rudick considered this possibility, suggesting that charitable transfers should remain un-
taxed, “except possibly in the case of transfers to private foundations.” See Rudick, supra note 79, 
at 41. This Article proposes that family-controlled charities have their own exemptions, just as 
individual family members do. See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text (discussing individ-
ual exemptions). 
 136 See Fleischer, supra note 31, 284–91. 
 137 Although rare, it is possible for a public charity to be effectively controlled by one family. 
See id. at 284–85 & n.92. 
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charities also give family members power over the assets held by the chari-
ty. As was discussed in the context of private trusts, this investment power 
can also translate into real economic power.138 In all these scenarios family 
members are still making decisions that have economic repercussions out-
side the family due to the transferred assets. 
Second, control of a charity can often yield political influence. Some-
times this influence is direct. Public charities, for example, are allowed to 
engage in limited amounts of lobbying. In addition, both public charities 
and private foundations can influence public discourse. For instance, they 
can engage in voter education activities and issue advocacy by conducting 
research studies and writing policy papers. Other times this influence is in-
direct. First, control of a charity can bring community prominence, which 
often translates into power.139 In the past, for example, control of a charity 
was one of the few avenues through which women could attain power and 
prominence in the community.140 Further, control of a charity also often 
serves as a stepping-stone to or from political office itself.141 
For these reasons, transfers to charities controlled by a member of the 
transferor’s family142 should not be completely free of tax. At the same 
time, however, this proposal acknowledges that control of charitable assets 
is not quite the same as having control over assets one owns outright. To that 
end, this proposal suggests that the rate for the special tax should be less than 
the special estate tax imposed on certain transfers in trust, and charitable 
recipients subject to the tax should be eligible for the liquidity provisions 
discussed below. 
F. Liquidity and Family Enterprises 
Concerns about family farms and small businesses will likely continue 
to play a large role in any political debate over wealth transfer taxation, es-
pecially if the special estate tax is perceived to be imposed on trusts holding 
such entities more frequently than on other trusts. Although the large per-
recipient exemption would likely completely shield from taxation enterpris-
                                                                                                                           
 138 See supra notes 95–129 and accompanying text. 
 139 See Gerald E. Auten et al., Taxes and Philanthropy Among the Wealthy, in DOES ATLAS 
SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 392–402 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 
2000) (describing the prestigious social networks that come with extensive charitable activity).  
 140 TERESA JEAN ODENDAHL, CHARITY BEGINS AT HOME 100–02 (1990). 
 141 Witness the Clinton Foundation. Another example is Elizabeth Dole, who headed the Red 
Cross after working in the Cabinet and before becoming a U.S. Senator. James A. Johnson, Inter-
view with Elizabeth Dole, President, American Red Cross, 43 J. HEALTHCARE MGMT. 211, 211 
(1998). 
 142 This Article suggests using rules such as those found in § 4958 to determine when a chari-
ty is controlled by a member of the transferor’s family. See generally I.R.C. § 4958 (taxing excess 
benefit transactions). 
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es that most people consider “small,” the public’s fear that a family business 
would have to be sold to pay tax would likely remain.143 To that end, this 
Article borrows from Lily Batchelder’s comprehensive inheritance tax plan 
in proposing relief for transferees whose tax liability exceeds liquid assets 
received plus some cushion.144 Such recipients would be required to pay tax 
up to the amount of liquid assets received (plus a cushion), but could defer 
the remainder of tax until liquidity issues eased through sale or receipt of 
distributions from the business.145 This relief should be available both to 
individuals facing the regular accessions tax and to trusts facing the special 
estate tax. Such a provision would address the specter of forced sales with-
out favoring illiquid over liquid assets.146 
G. Attribution and Amalgamation 
Thinking about family businesses raises another question: should fami-
ly members’ holdings be amalgamated to determine whether the exemption 
level has been reached? Consider Penelope, who inherits $5 million. Stand-
ing alone, $5 million is not enough to really give her political power and is 
below any likely exemption amount. But what if Penelope acts in concert 
with her four siblings, who each also inherit $5 million? Together, their $25 
million could bring with it political power. Although many siblings have 
divergent political and economic interests, in some cases, money is enough 
to encourage them to work together.147 
The problem, however, is that without more, the specter of familial co-
operation is quite speculative. For every family that decides to work togeth-
er to wield political influence, there is another family where members have 
divergent interests. To that end, a blanket rule amalgamating family mem-
bers’ holdings seems ill advised. 
That said, amalgamation or attribution seems warranted in the case of 
valuing jointly owned assets, such as active family businesses. In that sce-
nario, the business provides an additional incentive for familial cooperation. 
It is plausibly more likely that Penelope and her siblings will act in concert 
when each of their $5 million bequests comprises a share of a family busi-
ness than when it consists of separate assets. Moreover, such attribution 
                                                                                                                           
 143 A per-recipient exemption of $20 million, for example, means that the smallest-sized busi-
ness that could potentially trigger tax upon its transfer is one worth $20 million—hardly the food 
trucks and Christmas tree farms of political yore. 
 144 See Batchelder, supra note 2, at 90–93. 
 145 See id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Thank you to Bridget Crawford and Lee-ford Tritt for bringing this point to the author’s 
attention. 
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rules would minimize the ability of taxpayers to take advantage of valuation 
discounts.148 
H. Administrative Concerns 
Perhaps the most common criticism of accessions tax proposals is that 
they will increase filing burdens compared to an estate tax.149 This is so be-
cause an estate tax requires only one return, which is filed by the executor 
on behalf of the transferor. In contrast, an accessions tax requires transfer-
ees to file returns, which—assuming decedents leave their estates to more 
than one heir—will increase the number of people required to file some 
type of return. Although it is true that accessions tax proposals will require 
more individuals to file returns, this hurdle does not render such proposals 
unworkable.150 
As an initial matter, an accessions tax return could simply accompany 
the income tax return.151 This would link filing of the accessions tax return 
to a familiar ritual during which individuals are already accounting for the 
year’s inflows. Although individuals would have to account for accessions 
received in prior years that exceeded the annual exclusion, this is not such a 
burden as to render an accessions tax unworkable. Most individuals receiv-
ing gifts and bequests that exceed the exclusion amount are likely already 
keeping careful financial records, such as their prior years’ income tax re-
turns. Computer programs such as TurboTax could easily be adapted to rec-
ord such information, and there is no reason the IRS cannot also track such 
data and share it with taxpayers, much like the Social Security Administra-
tion mails statements to individuals who have not yet retired showing what 
benefits have accrued.152 Requiring transferors and third parties—who are 
already used to filing transfer tax forms and sending informational sched-
ules to taxpayers—could further enhance compliance and reduce errors.153 
Despite the increased reporting requirements, other features of an ac-
cessions tax are less complex than the estate tax. Namely, an accessions tax 
reduces the advantage many transferors currently gain from engaging in a 
number of tax-planning techniques, including splitting married clients’ es-
                                                                                                                           
 148 See Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Revitalizing the Estate Tax: 5 Easy Pieces, 142 
TAX NOTES 1231, 1232–35 (2014) (addressing the problem of minority discounts involving con-
trol of an entity or asset by family members). 
 149 See Gerzog, supra note 62, at 174 (critiquing the comprehensive income tax proposal on 
administrative grounds that would also apply to an accessions tax). 
 150 The experiences of other jurisdictions with accessions taxes further demonstrate its admin-
istrability. 
 151 See Rudick, supra note 79, at 34, 42. 
 152 See Dodge, Replacing, supra note 5, at 1010. 
 153 See Batchelder, supra note 2, at 64–65; Dodge, Replacing, supra note 5, at 1010; Halbach, 
supra note 44, at 270; Rudick, supra note 79, at 42–43. 
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tates into marital and bypass portions154 and using charitable trusts and 
grantor retained annuity trusts to engage in valuation games.155 Valuation 
concerns are reduced greatly, as are the importance of provisions such as 
§§ 2036–2038 of the Internal Revenue Code.156 
CONCLUSION 
Theorists and policymakers frequently invoke the goal of minimizing 
dynastic wealth transfers when justifying the estate and gift taxes. This Ar-
ticle interprets that aim as an objection to hereditable economic and politi-
cal power, and mines that concern for insights into the ideal transfer tax sys-
tem. This analysis shows that a transfer tax system designed to fight the 
transfer of wealth great enough to bestow political and economic power 
upon the recipient has little in common with the current structure for taxing 
wealth taxes. Instead of our current, transferor-focused estate tax, the for-
mer would be a progressive, transferee-focused accessions tax with an ex-
tremely large per-recipient exemption. It would not penalize generation-
skipping transfers, but would tax, at a lower rate, transfers to family founda-
tions and other charitable organizations controlled by the donor’s family. 
                                                                                                                           
 154 Despite portability, many wealthy couples still engage in traditional marital planning be-
cause the generation-skipping transfer tax exemption is not portable. 
 155 See Batchelder, supra note 2, at 74–76; Halbach, supra note 44, at 221–22. 
 156 See I.R.C. §§ 2036–2038 (2012) (creating rules related to transfers with retained life es-
tates, transfers taking effect at death, and revocable transfers). 
